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THE POLITICS OF PRESUMPTION:
ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER v. HICKS AND
THE BURDENS OF PROOF IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
MARK A. SCHUMAN*
The Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks1 was one of the most controversial decisions the Court
handed down in a largely low-key 1992-93 term. The decision de-
termined the relative burdens of proof the plaintiff and defendant
carry in a suit charging intentional employment discrimination
(also know as "disparate treatment") under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").2 These issues are particularly im-
portant in light of the jury trials and damages available in causes
of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title
VII.3 Hicks is important both for its practical affect on the burden
of proof and, also, in a larger sense, for its affect on the politics of
* J.D., Yale Law School, 1991; B.A., Harpur College, Binghamton University, 1988. The
author is a former Law Clerk to the Honorable Samuel A. Alito, Jr. of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and is an associate of McCarter & English in New-
ark, New Jersey. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author. The
author expresses his thanks to LEXIS for the use of its legal research services. This article
is dedicated to the Honorable Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and to Susan Elaina Kabat Schuman,
for her loving support. Copyright © 1994, Mark A. Schuman.
1 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
2 Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
3 The majority of federal courts to consider the question prior to the Civil Rights Act of
1991 held that since the relief available under Title VII (including reinstatement, promo-
tion, and back pay) was equitable in nature, there was no right to trial of claims thereunder
by jury. See, e.g., Ramos v. Roche Prods., Inc., 936 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 379 (1991); Turner v. Mitchell Pontiac, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 530, 531-34 (D. Conn.
1991). Such actions were tried to the court as finder of fact. Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
granted rights both to compensatory and punitive damages, in certain cases, and to jury
trials where the plaintiff seeks that relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1992) (jury trial right
in certain Title VII suits); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)-(b) (1992) (compensatory and punitive dam-
ages available in certain Title VII suits, subject to limitations in amount depending on
number of persons employed by employer).
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employment discrimination law.
This Article will explore the issues resolved in Hicks and place
that decision within a legal, political, and economic context. Part
One discusses the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, in which the Court first established the struc-
ture of proof in Title VII disparate treatment cases. Part Two dis-
cusses later Supreme Court decisions which created the
presumption of illegal discrimination which is created by the
plaintiffs proof of a prima facie case. Part Three discusses the
conflict which arose among Supreme Court opinions regarding the
affect of the presumption (the conflict Hicks resolved). Part Four
discusses and elaborates upon the Hicks decision itself. Part Five
discusses the practical impact, and finally, Part Six the political
impact, of Hicks.
I. THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS STRUCTURE
In most cases outside of employment discrimination, the plain-
tiff lacking "direct" proof of a violation of law by the defendant
has, at best, a very weak case. Such a plaintiff is unlikely to be
able to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial, and thus is
likely to suffer summary judgment in favor of the defendant.4 Not
so the plaintiff alleging illegal employment discrimination. The
plaintiff, in such a case, may survive summary judgment and pre-
vail at trial, by proof, not of the violation itself, but of facts far
easier to establish. This plaintiff is said to possess "indirect
proof."
The Supreme Court established this lower standard for plain-
tiffs charging intentional Title VII violations, but lacking direct
proof thereof, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.' The plaintiff,
4 FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c). Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if [the available
proof] show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id.
5 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas had laid off the plaintiff in a general reduction
in force and denied him reinstatement when it began to add employees in the plaintiffs
trade. Id. at 794. McDonnell Douglas's professed reason for refusing to rehire the plaintiff
was his commission, after the layoff, of illegal acts intended to harm McDonnell Douglas
and its employees. Id. One of these acts was a "stall-in," in which the plaintiff and several
others stopped their cars in a coordinated effort to entirely block an access road to a Mc-
Donnell Douglas plant. Id. at 795. The plaintiffs efforts were apparently designed to ex-
press protest against McDonnell Douglas hiring practices, which he and others believed
were racially motivated. Id. at 794-95. McDonnell Douglas also believed that the plaintiff
was involved in a "lock-in," in which the door to a McDonnell Douglas facility was chained
and locked in order to prevent its occupants, McDonnell Douglas employees, from leaving
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the Court ruled, bears the "initial burden" of establishing what
the Court termed a "prima facie case" of illegal discrimination.6
This consists of four elements which the plaintiff must prove: (1)
membership in (in the case of alleged racial discrimination) "a ra-
cial minority"; (2) that he or she "applied and was qualified for"
the job for which the employer sought applicants; (3) that he or
she was rejected; and (4) that the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applications.7 Some courts have sub-
sequently added that the plaintiff must prove that one not sharing
the same protected characteristic, i.e., race, color, sex, etc., re-
ceived the job, promotion, or benefit in question.8
If the plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima facie case,
"the burden," the Court ruled, "then must shift to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its deci-
sion.9 The plaintiff is thereafter entitled to the opportunity to
prove that the employer's articulated reasons were merely a "pre-
text" for a decision which was, in truth, made on an illegal basis.10
This scheme has been adopted in cases alleging disparate treat-
ment" on each of the grounds made illegal by Title VII, 12 as well
as in cases alleging disparate treatment age discrimination under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.'" Courts have wide
discretion, however, in fashioning structures for proof of a prima
facie case different from the one McDonnell Douglas established.' 4
the building. Id. at 795.
6 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
7 Id.
8 See Gunby v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3213 (1989).
9 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also infra note 74 (discussing that Hicks deci-
sion may be understood in terms of proving "pretext").
10 Id. at 804-05.
11 See id. at 802 n.14. The McDonnell Douglas scheme is not applicable to disparate
impact claims, in which the plaintiff claims that a facially neutral practice or criterion for
an employment decision tends to exclude those from a particular sex, race, religion, ethnic-
ity, or age. Id.; see also United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713 n.1 (1983);
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 n.5 (1981).
12 See Jones v. Frank, 973 F.2d 673, 675 (8th Cir. 1992) (sex discrimination); see also
Kenworthy v. Conoco, Inc., 979 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1992) (age and national origin
discrimination); Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829
(1985) (religious discrimination).
13 See Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 52, 53-54 (1st Cir.
Oct. 18, 1993); Anderson v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 965 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1992).
14 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The "prima facie proof" articulated in McDonnell
Douglas, the Court allowed "is not necessarily applicable in every respect" to cases where
the facts differ from those of that case. Id. at 802 n.13. In addition, the plaintiff need not
use the McDonnell Douglas structure for proof of a prima facie case where she presents
direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
1993]
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The McDonnell Douglas Court gave no justification or authority
for its establishment of this structure for proof of illegal discrimi-
nation. The Court did not cite or discuss any passage from Title
VII or any other part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Nor did the
Court argue that any legislative history from the Act lent support
to, or even suggested, such a set of rules. The Court did not ex-
plain how proof of a prima facie case had any logical or inferential
relationship to proof of the employer's intent itself. The Court did
not expound upon shifting burdens of proof, presumptions, or any
other procedural rules used in any other cause of action, whether
statutory or common law, from which it had drawn this scheme.
The Court did not cite any power a court might possess to struc-
ture the presentation of evidence in a way most conducive to accu-
rate fact-finding. The Court's pronunciation of the prima facie
case and the shift in burden to the employer stands starkly naked,
without the armor of congressional support, common-law author-
ity, or reasoning. The opinion is unanimous. No Justice bothered
to concur and explain his own rationale for the holding of the case,
let alone dissent from the creation, without explanation, defense,
or justification, of the elements of a cause of action purportedly
created by Congress.
The rules laid down in McDonnell Douglas are an audacious
and arbitrary exercise of power. In this way, the establishment of
the structure of proof is closer to a legislative creation of policy
than a judicial expression of the law under authority and reason.
The McDonnell Douglas opinion kept the most important aspect
of the new structure of proof hidden: that is, the reason, the au-
thority, or the policy behind shifting any burden to the employer
based on the particular showing it said the plaintiff must make in
order to shift that burden. Though later cases enunciated a policy
behind the scheme, those cases also took the structure itself for
granted. Essentially, the Supreme Court avoided the difficulties
of justifying and formulating the structure of proof simultane-
ously. Once the scheme was established, the Court could go about
creating a (questionable) policy basis without allowing the scheme
itself to be called into question.
U.S. 111, 121 (1985); Schafer v. Board of Pub. Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 247 (3d Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 9:67
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II. THE CREATION OF THE PRESUMPTION
While McDonnell Douglas laid out the procedures and allocated
the burden of proof in a disparate treatment case, it did not speak
of the creation of a "presumption" by the establishment of a prima
facie case. Without a basis in policy for the scheme, the McDon-
nell Douglas Court could not claim that proof of a prima facie case
either established or allowed the presumption of any fact; rather,
it could only assert that the proof shifted the burden (of some
kind) to the defendant. In later cases, however, the Court referred
to the proof of a prima facie case as the creation of a presumption
of the ultimate fact of a disparate treatment case, that the employ-
ment decision was made on the basis of race, sex, or another ille-
gal criterion.
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,15
the Court described proof of a prima facie case as "justifi[cation] of
the inference that the minority applicant was denied an employ-
ment opportunity for reasons prohibited by Title VII ... ,"16 This,
rather than the "specification of the discrete elements of proof,"
the Teamsters Court asserted, was the significance of McDonnell
Douglas.17 This effectively turned McDonnell Douglas on its head.
All McDonnell Douglas had done was to assert discrete elements
of proof, without discussing why those elements were significant
or should be regarded as cause to shift a burden on to the defend-
ant. Yet, Teamsters regarded McDonnell Douglas as laying per-
fectly solid policy groundwork for the notion that the plaintiff may
create an inference of illegal discrimination by proof of some other
set of facts.
The Court, in truth, did not enunciate a policy basis for the in-
ference of illegal discrimination until Teamsters itself. The Team-
sters Court described the McDonnell Douglas formula as requiring
the plaintiff to demonstrate:
at least that his rejection did not result from the two most
15 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
16 Id. at 358; see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). "McDon-
nell Douglas did make it clear that a Title VII plaintiff carries the initial burden of showing
actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain unex-
plained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were 'based on a discriminatory
criterion illegal under [Title VII].'- Id. (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)).
17 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359.
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common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely
to reject a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of quali-
fications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought. Elimi-
nation of these reasons for the refusal to hire is sufficient, ab-
sent other explanation, to create an inference that the
decision was a discriminatory one.' 8
The Court elaborated on this ex-ante justification for the Mc-
Donnell Douglas scheme in later opinions. In Furnco Construc-
tion Corp. v. Waters,'9 the Court asserted that a prima facie case
raises an inference of illegal discrimination "only because" a prima
facie case establishes that the decision was "more likely than not
based on the consideration of impermissible factors."20 This is
true, the Court claimed, because "we know from our experience"
that people usually do not act arbitrarily, especially in the busi-
ness setting.21 "Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an
applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the em-
ployer's actions," the fact-finder should infer that an impermissi-
ble consideration was at play. 22 In Texas Department of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine,2 3 the Court declared that the prima facie
case "eliminated the most common nondiscriminatory reasons" for
the employment decision, creating a presumption that the em-
ployer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.24
Within this context, we may better understand both the contro-
versy which St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks resolved and the im-
pact that decision may have. Hicks addressed one implication of
the policy behind the presumption of illegal discrimination.
III. THE CONFLICT: ARTICULATION OR PROOF?
McDonnell Douglas provided that, upon proof of a prima facie
case by the plaintiff, the burden fell upon the employer to "articu-
late some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection."25 The meaning of this burden, what the employer must
do to survive a directed verdict for the plaintiff, and what, if any
18 Id. at 358 n.44.
19 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
20 Id. at 577.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 578.
23 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
24 Id. at 253-54.
25 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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burden, remains on the plaintiff despite his proof of a prima facie
case, was the focus of subsequent Supreme Court cases.
After the bare description of McDonnell Douglas, the Court
elaborated on the employer's burden in Furnco.26 Furnco marked
the beginning of the confusion between the "articulation" of a rea-
son unprohibited by law and the "proof' of such a reason. The
Court described the employer's burden as "merely that of proving
that he based his employment decision on a legitimate considera-
tion . .. 7 The same paragraph quoted McDonnell Douglas' re-
quirement that the employer "need only 'articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason . . . .'"28 The Court was
apparently (and unaccountably) ignorant of the contrast between
articulation and proof, and of the self-contradiction it had
committed.
The conflict generated by this contradiction first arose directly
in Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney. 29 The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, resting on
McDonnell Douglas, ruled that the employer's burden was to
prove "absence of discriminatory motive."30 The Supreme Court
found this in error. The Court drew the "significant distinction"
between "articulating" a legitimate reason, as McDonnell Douglas
had put it, and "proving" nondiscriminatory motive. 31
The Court considered virtually the same question in Texas Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine.32 In Burdine, the Court maintained
that the plaintiff retained the "ultimate burden of persuading" the
fact-finder that the employer intentionally discriminated. 3  The
shifting burdens, according to Burdine, merely served to bring the
court "expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate question."34 Never-
theless, the burden on the employer is real: if she remains silent,
the presumption of illegal discrimination raised by the prima facie
26 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 567 (1978).
27 Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 478 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
29 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
30 Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 177 (1st Cir.),
vacated, 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
31 Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 27-29.
32 450 U.S. 248, 250 (1981). "The narrow question presented is whether, after the plain-
tiff has proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the burden shifts to the
defendant to persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action existed." Id.
33 Id. at 253.
34 Id.
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case is sufficient to cause judgement to be entered in favor of the
plaintiff.35
Burdine apparently resolved the contradiction between "articu-
lation" and "proof' that Furnco had introduced. The employer
"need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons," it need only "raise[ ] a genuine issue of fact as
to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff' by introducing
evidence of the reasons for its decision.36 The employer rebuts the
presumption if she "articulates lawful reasons for the action."37
Burdine explained that the affect the presumption of illegal dis-
crimination has on the burden of proof is "a traditional feature of
the common law"; it places a "burden of production" on the em-
ployer.38 With this production burden does come the minimum,
basic burden of proof: in order to evade summary verdict, the em-
ployer must raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the reason for
her employment decision.3 ' The McDonnell Douglas scheme, ac-
cording to Burdine, is a device "intended progressively to sharpen
the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional
discrimination."4 °
Burdine did leave some potential ambiguity. First, Burdine
maintained that if the employer meets its burden of production,
"the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity" in which
the plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate pretext of dis-
crimination. 41 Burdine also described the plaintiffs burden in the
pretext stage as "merg[ing] with the ultimate burden of persuad-
ing the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimi-
nation."42 This the plaintiff may do one of two ways: either di-
rectly, by persuading that an illegal basis more likely than not
motivated the employer, or "indirectly, by showing that the em-
ployer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 43 The am-
biguity Burdine left was in equating the conclusion that the em-
ployer's proffered reason was unworthy of credence with the
35 Id. at 254.
36 Id. at 254-55.
37 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257.
38 Id. at 255 n.8.
39 Id. at 254.
40 Id. at 255 n.8.
41 Id. at 255.
42 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
43 Id.
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necessity of the fact-finder concluding that the employer had in-
tentionally discriminated against the employee. While, from the
totality of the opinion, one may fairly conclude that Burdine
meant that the fact-finder may find intentional discrimination if it
disbelieves the employer, but is not compelled to do so, neverthe-
less the logical door was left slightly ajar by this language. This
leeway allowed aggressive plaintiffs to maintain that they were
entitled to judgment based solely on the incredibility of the em-
ployer regarding the reasons for its action.
In United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,44
the Supreme Court addressed "indirect proof" of intentional dis-
crimination. The Court held that the plaintiff need not offer direct
proof of the employer's discriminatory intent in order to prevail.45
Rather, the plaintiff may prove her case either by "direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence,"46 and that the finder of fact was free to
give such evidence "whatever weight and credence it deserves."4 7
The Court stressed that once a prima facie case was established,
and the employer responds "by offering evidence of the reason" for
his decision, the fact-finder must then decide the ultimate ques-
tion: whether the employer intentionally discriminated on an ille-
gal basis.48 The prima facie case is simply irrelevant, i.e., "drops
from the case," once the employer has done everything that is re-
quired of him in response to the establishment of the presumption
of illegal discrimination. 49 At that point, the evidence is to be eval-
uated, and the ultimate question of fact is to be decided, just as is
any disputed fact in civil litigation.50
The Supreme Court failed, however, to fully resolve the ambigu-
ity in the nature of the showing of discrimination that was intro-
duced in Burdine. The Court charged the finder of fact, once both
sides had been heard, to "decide which party's explanation of the
employer's motivation it believes."5 ' The Court admonished that
"[n]one of this means that [courts] should treat discrimination dif-
44 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
45 Id. at 713, 717.
46 Id. at 714 n.3.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 714-15.
49 Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715.
50 Id. at 715-16.
51 Id. at 716.
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ferently from other ultimate questions of fact"52 or "make their in-
quiry even more difficult by applying legal rules which were
designed to govern 'the basic allocations of burdens and order of
presentation of proof.'"5 " Nevertheless, the ambiguity regarding
the burden of proof of the plaintiff and the employer with regard
to the ultimate question of fact, however slight, remained.
IV. THE H,'cKs DECISION
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the employee, a shift com-
mander at a half way house operated by the state of Missouri, al-
leged that his employer had demoted and then discharged him be-
cause of his race.54 The district court held a full bench trial, and
found that the plaintiff had proven a prima facie case: Hicks
proved that he was black; that he was qualified for the position of
shift commander; that he was demoted and ultimately discharged
from that position; and that the position from which he was dis-
charged remained open and was ultimately filled by a white
man.55 The employer introduced evidence of two reasons for its
demotion and discharge of the plaintiff: the severity and accumu-
lation of rules violations committed by the plaintiff.5"
The district court found that neither of the reasons offered by
the employer was the real reason for the plaintiffs demotion.
The court found, nevertheless, that the plaintiff had failed to carry
his burden of proving that the employer was motivated by race.
Although the plaintiff had proven "a crusade to terminate him,"
he had not convinced the district court that "the crusade was ra-
cially rather than personally motivated."" The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit set this conclusion aside;
once the fact-finder concluded that the employer's proffered rea-
sons was incredible, the Eighth Circuit ruled, the plaintiff was en-
titled to judgment as a matter of law.5 9 An employer who offered a
discredited reason, the court asserted, was no better off within
52 Id.
53 Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981)).
54 Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970
F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
55 Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1249-50.
56 Id. at 1250.
57 Id. at 1252.
58 Id.
59 Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
2742 (1993).
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the McDonnell Douglas scheme than one who had failed to offer
any evidence at all to rebut the presumption of illegal
discrimination. 0
The Supreme Court disagreed.6 1 In order to rebut the presump-
tion of illegal discrimination, the employer need only produce evi-
dence which, "if believed by the trier of fact," would support a find-
ing that it was motivated by a reason not prohibited by Title VII.
62
The employer's burden is merely one of production, not persua-
sion. As the Court had also noted in Burdine, the employer need
not prove that it was motivated by the reasons it offers.63 This is
so, in part, due to the nature of presumptions under Federal Rule
of Evidence ("Rule") 301. Under this rule, presumptions in civil
cases impose a "burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or
meet the presumption," but do not shift "the burden of proof in the
sense of the risk of nonpersuasion."64 Rule 301 applies to the pre-
sumption of illegal discrimination created by the prima facie case,
as it does to every civil-law presumption. 65 The Court had noted
on numerous occasions that the burden of persuading the fact-
finder that the employer was motivated by an illegal criterion re-
mained, despite the shifting burden of production, upon the
employee.66
The McDonnell Douglas framework, including the presumption
of illegal discrimination, vanishes with the employer's satisfaction
of this burden of production.67 The presumption, the Supreme
Court asserted, serves solely to force the employer to come for-
ward with evidence to support a verdict in her favor .6 The fact-
finder proceeds, free from any affect of the presumption, to the
ultimate question of whether the employer was motivated by ille-
60 Id. at 492.
61 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
62 Id. at 2747 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-
55 n.8 (1981)).
63 Id. at 2749 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254).
64 FED. R. EVID. 301.
65 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747, 2749.
66 Id. at 2747, 2749-50; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187
(1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245-46 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring); Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 270 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 286-88
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 875
(1984); United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983); Burdine, 450 U.S. at
253.
67 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
6S Id.
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gal considerations. 69 While the fact-finder may find illegal dis-
crimination from all the evidence considered, including the em-
ployer's offered reasons (if they are incredible), the fact-finder may
also find no illegal discrimination despite its skepticism of the em-
ployer's offered rationale for the employment decision. 0
In order for a court to impose liability under Title VII, the fact-
finder must conclude that the employer has discriminated on an
unlawful basis. The law gives no license to a court to substitute a
lesser finding. 71 Thus, a finding that the employer's explanation of
its decision is unbelievable is not in itself legally significant under
Title VII. Even if the employer is lying about her motivation for
the decision (which does not follow necessarily from her incredibil-
ity on the question), "Title VII is not a cause of action for perjury
"72
The plaintiffs burden in the "pretext" stage of the case is not
merely to discredit the employer's explanation. It is, rather, more
complicated. The plaintiff must show that "whatever the stated
reasons for his rejection, the decision was in reality racially [or
sexually, religiously, etc.] premised."73 Casting doubt on the em-
ployer's reasons must necessarily be a part of the pretext showing.
Nevertheless, the Court maintained, the plaintiffs opportunity is
to show the employer's reasons are pretext for discrimination
based on an illegal criterion, not merely pretext for discrimination
based on a reason other than that offered by the employer. The
plaintiff cannot show that the reason is a pretext for discrimina-
tion without showing both that the reason is false and that dis-
crimination was the real reason. 4
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 2751.
72 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2754. The Court criticized the dissent for assuming that incredi-
bility was the same as perjury and prevarication. Id. The fact-finder may very well con-
clude that a witness is incredible without possessing the confidence in its conclusion, or
enough information regarding the events in question, to conclude that a witness lied. This
is especially true where motivation, an inherently unobservable attribute rather than a
physical occurrence, is at issue; the fact-finder may only infer state of mind from behavior.
In addition, the employer is often an organization, which is often controlled by more than
one person acting in concert and each without complete control to make decisions, and
must rely both on statements of fact by agents and on agents to make decisions in its name.
73 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2753 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
805 n.18 (1973)).
74 Id. at 2752. In one sense, the Hicks decision may be understood in terms of the mean-
ing of proving "pretext." Some circuits and the Hicks dissent understood pretext to refer
merely to the falsity of the reasons the employer offers in the litigation, and that whether
the true reason (for which the offered reason is a "cover") was an illegal basis is immaterial.
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Many of the dissent's arguments rested on the characterizations
of the pretext burden in Burdine. The Court responded to each.
The plaintiff has the opportunity to show, as Burdine put it, that
the employer's offered reasons "were not its true reasons, but were
a pretext for discrimination." 5 The dissent took this to mean that
if the plaintiff proves the asserted reason to be false, the plaintiff
is entitled to judgment. According to the Court, however, the
plaintiff cannot prove those reasons pretextual without proving
that those reasons pretextual for discrimination; in other words,
the plaintiff must show both that the reason was false and that
illegal discrimination was the real reason. 6
Burdine described the inquiry after the employer meets her bur-
den of production as "proceed[ing] to a new level of specificity."77
The Court took the view that this referred to the "few generalized
factors that establish a prima facie case to the specific proofs and
rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have intro-
duced."78 According to Burdine, the plaintiffs burden to show that
the employer's proffered reasons were not the true reasons
"merges with the ultimate burden" of proving intentional discrimi-
nation. 9 This, the Court commented, means that the plaintiffs
burden of showing pretext is part of the ultimate burden of prov-
ing intentional discrimination, but does not replace it. 8 0 If, after
all, the plaintiff cannot persuade the fact-finder that the reasons
the employer offers were not the true motivation for the decision,
he cannot, by definition, persuade that the true reason was what
he claims it was, i.e., his race, sex, national origin, etc.
The Court agreed with the dissent's argument that one passage
from Burdine, which observed that the plaintiff may persuade the
court of intentional illegal discrimination "indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence," contradicted the Court's holding. The passage from
The Hicks Court ruling is premised on a different meaning: that pretext refers to proof that
the employer's offered reason is not the true one and that an illegal basis truly was the
reason. Pretext, to the Hicks Court, means pretext for discrimination. While some commen-
tators complain that Hicks requires the plaintiff to prove "pretext plus," this is only true if
one rejects the Court's notion that proof of pretext means proof that discrimination was the
true reason for the employer's decision.
75 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
76 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993).
77 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
78 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
79 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
80 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
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Burdine commented that the plaintiff may persuade that inten-
tional discrimination took place "either directly, by persuading the
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the em-
ployer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered ex-
planation is unworthy of credence.""' These words, the Court ad-
mitted with resignation, "bear no other meaning but that the
falsity of the employer's explanation is alone enough to compel
judgment for the plaintiff."8 2 According to the Hicks Court, how-
ever, the passage in question "contradicts or renders inexplicable
numerous other statements" in Burdine and elsewhere.8 3
Even so, the Court's surrender on the meaning of the passage
was mistaken and unnecessary. Despite its apparent tenacity in
defending its interpretation of other passages in Burdine as con-
sistent with its holding, the Court granted a point it need not
have. As the Court points out elsewhere in its opinion, the plain-
tiff's proof that the employer's offered reasons are untrue, while
not requiring a directed verdict for the plaintiff, is sufficient to
support a finding of intentional discrimination if the fact-finder is
persuaded by consideration of this, and all, evidence that the em-
ployer intentionally illegally discriminated. This is "indirect
proof' of discrimination. No more is necessary to create a genuine
issue of fact on the ultimate question of intentional illegal discrim-
ination. The passage from Burdine, read to refer to what is suffi-
cient evidence to support a finding of fact, rather than what is nec-
essary to win a directed verdict, is consistent with this analysis.
The dissent further argued that the fact-finder's inquiry should
be limited "by the scope of the employer's proffered explanation."8 4
Otherwise, the dissent fretted, the plaintiff had to address "any
conceivable explanation for the employer's actions that might be
suggested by the evidence, however unrelated to the employer's
articulated reasons ...."85 The Court argued that the objection
mischaracterized the fact-finding in an employment discrimina-
tion case. The reasons the employer offers are established by the
introduction of evidence in an effort to persuade the fact-finder
thereby, not communicated apart from the record either by a
81 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
82 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993) (emphasis in original).
83 Id. at 2752-53.
84 Id. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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means conducive to limiting the relevancy of the employer's case
or by a means unavailable to plaintiff observation or free from
plaintiff criticism. While the dissent expected employers to some-
how "inject into the trial an unarticulated reasons," the Court
noted that the employer's reasons can only be articulated by intro-
duction of evidence on the record.8 6 The dissent, the Court noted,
seemed to contemplate articulation of reasons, aside from the rec-
ord, both in a way obvious enough to limit the inquiry and so cov-
ert as to evade the plaintiffs ability to attempt to detect and con-
tradict them.
V. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT
It is easy to overstate the practical implications of the Hicks de-
cision. Uncertainty pervades any judicial fact-finding, but as the
motivation or basis for a decision exists only in the mind of the
decision-maker and has no "physical" expression or dimension,
proof of any fact regarding this state of mind is especially uncer-
tain. The placement of the burden of proof is especially important
in such cases.
The Hicks opinion significantly affects the plaintiffs burden of
proof under the law as it has been understood in some circuits,
where the plaintiff was entitled to judgment if she merely proved
that the employer's proffered reasons were untrue.8 7 Plaintiffs
will find their chances to obtain summary judgment or directed
verdict greatly diminished in these circuits. Previously, in these
circuits, mere disproof of the employer's proffered reasons suf-
ficed; now, at the very least, plaintiffs will have to show that a
rational jury could come to no conclusion other than that the em-
ployer had intentionally discriminated on an illegal basis. The
presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case is
86 Id. at 2755.
87 See, e.g., Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 970 F.2d 487, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993); Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 228 (1991); Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554 (11th Cir.
1990); Tye v. Board of Educ. of Polaris Joint Vocational Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 315, 320 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Thornburgh v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 639-40, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1985);
Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395-96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1087 (1984). Some other circuits, have concluded that the plaintiff must convince
the fact-finder that the employer acted on an illegal basis, not merely that the reasons
offered by employer were not the true reasons for the decision. See Benzies v. Illinois Dep't
of Mental Health, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987).
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gone, having "drop[ped] out of the picture,""' by this stage of the
trial. The presumption now has effect only if the plaintiff suc-
ceeds in establishing a prima facie case and the employer fails to
introduce any evidence of a legal basis for its decision, i.e., if the
employer remains silent at the close of a plaintiffs proven prima
facie case of discrimination. The employer must, however, offer
evidence credible enough to create a genuine issue of fact regard-
ing the basis of its decision, in order to survive summary judgment
and get to a trial, 9 and to allow a reasonable fact-finder to find for
the employer on that question.90
Yet, the plaintiff still may prove her case indirectly in the wake
of Hicks.91 Hicks makes it clear that the plaintiff may present all
the evidence necessary to permit the fact-finder to find intentional
discrimination merely by casting sufficient doubt on the veracity
of the employer's proffered reasons regarding the true motivation
of the employer.92 The import of Hicks is that the plaintiff is not
88 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
89 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
90 See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a). In cases heard by the court as fact-finder, such as those
under Title VII unamended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the court could enter judgment
as a matter of law on a claim against a party who had been fully heard with respect to an
issue if that claim could not be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that
issue. See FED. R. Crv. P. 52(c); see also Sailor v. Hubbell, Inc., 4 F.3d 323, 325 n.2 (4th Cir.
1993).
91 Some commentators have misinterpreted Hicks on this point. See Raymond Nardo, St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks Bursts Bubble in Employment Discrimination, N.Y.L.J., Aug.
9, 1993, at 1, col. 1. Mr. Nardo claims that Hicks renders plaintiffs indirect proof of illegal
discrimination (via disproof of the employer's proffered reasons) virtually identical to direct
proof, in which the plaintiff produces direct evidence (such as comments made by the em-
ployer or its agents) to support an illegal discriminatory motive. Id. Mr. Nardo is also con-
cerned that plaintiffs are deprived of "their day in court" when direct evidence is unavaila-
ble. Id.
While plaintiffs have been deprived of an advantage in employment discrimination liti-
gation-namely, the opportunity for judgment as a matter of law without a conclusion re-
garding whether the employer illegally discriminated-they retain their opportunity to
convince triers of fact by indirect evidence (the incredibility of the employer's proffered
reasons) of the ultimate factual issue of the case. Mr. Nardo shares Justice David Souter's
fear, expressed in the dissenting opinion of the latter in Hicks, that juries will find no
discrimination despite disbelief of the employer's reasons. Yet, the risk that the fact-finder
will believe neither party's explanation of the events in question is one aspect of the risk of
nonpersuasion borne by plaintiffs in cases arising in contract, tort, and countless other
contexts.
92 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993). In order to survive
summary judgment, according to some courts, the plaintiff must raise a reasonable infer-
ence of illegal discrimination in her showing that the employer's reasons are unworthy of
credence. See EEOC v. MCI Int'l, 829 F. Supp. 1438, 1451 (D.N.J. 1993). Other courts have
held that the plaintiffs mere proof of the untruth of the employer's proffered reasons along
with his proof of a prima facie case, is sufficient to survive summary judgment, without the
necessity of the plaintiff raising an inference of illegal discrimination in any other way. See
Reiff v. Philadelphia County Court, 827 F. Supp. 319, 324-25 (E.D. Pa. 1993). This distinc-
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assured judgment merely from casting doubt, no matter how con-
vincingly, on the employer's reason.93 Even if no reasonable fact-
finder could conclude that the employer's proffered reasons were
the true ones for the employer's decision, if the fact-finder could
nonetheless conclude that an illegal basis was not the true reason,
the plaintiff will not receive summary judgment or a directed ver-
dict. Hicks also requires that the court charge the jury that, even
if it disbelieves the reasons the employer advances for its decision,
it must conclude from the evidence presented to it that the em-
ployer acted on an illegal basis in order to find for the plaintiff.
Furthermore, Hicks does not significantly affect how employers
will go about defending disparate intent cases. While employers
rebut the presumption of discrimination by introducing evidence
of any legal basis for its decision, they will continue to seek to
make this evidence more than barely credible. They will continue
to argue that the reasons they present were the true reasons for
the decision. It is cold comfort to employers that the jury may find
no illegal discrimination even if it disbelieves the employer's proof.
Employers will be unwise to rely on juries' disbelief of both the
plaintiffs explanation of illegal discrimination and the employer's
explanation in favor of a rationale unstressed by either party.94
Hicks still leaves Title VII disparate treatment plaintiffs in an
enviable position among plaintiffs: proof of a prima facie case re-
lieves them of the burden of coming forward with direct evidence
of intentional discrimination. Plaintiffs who have established a
prima facie case may, as a strategic matter, rely solely on their
tion may suggest that Hicks failed to fully resolve all potential issues of burdens of proof it
raised. See Victoria A. Cundiff & Ann E. Chaitovitz, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Lots
of Sound and Fury, But What Does it Signify?, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 143 (1993). However,
most courts are likely to conclude that proof of the incredibility of the employer's proffered
reasons is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the true reason was
illegal discrimination. See Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir.
1994) (plaintiff may survive summary judgment merely by raising doubt of credibility of
employer's proffered reasons because "[i]f the only reason an employer offers for firing an
employee is a lie, the inference that the real reason was a forbidden one, such as age, may
rationally be drawn.").
93 See Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 329 (3d
Cir. 1993). "Showing pretext is not necessarily sufficient to meet the plaintiffs burden of
proof." Id. Note, however, that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was
employing pretext in the sense of cover for any other reason for the employment action,
rather than in the sense of cover particularly for an illegal reason.
94 See Cundiff& Chaitovitz, supra note 92, at 156. "To prevail in a pretext-based employ-
ment discrimination case, an employer must still... offer complete and credible reasons for
its actions, and effectively undermine the plaintiffs claim of pretext. If an employer fails in
these efforts, it will still very likely lose." Id. (emphasis in original).
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rebuttal of the employer's proffered reasons in order to reach the
jury. Employers may not take a typical defendant's tack of casting
doubt on the plaintiffs proof while not relying on their own affirm-
ative proof of anything. Because of the presumption of illegal dis-
crimination, a sufficient plaintiffs proof is a far lesser showing
than would otherwise be necessary to survive a summary judg-
ment or directed verdict motion. If plaintiffs will no longer receive
judgment as a matter of law in some cases they might have in
some circuits before Hicks, their ability to send the case to the
fact-finder is undiminished, and is a relatively easy task at that.9 5
VI. THE POLITICAL IMPACT
The political impact of Hicks is far greater than the practical
impact. The Supreme Court construed the presumption created
by the prima facie case in an extremely weak form. That pre-
sumption lay at the heart of the liberal civil rights ideology of em-
ployment discrimination. As an attack on the political power of
the presumption of illegal discrimination, Hicks is a dangerous
blow to that ideology.
The idea of a presumption is that by proof of some simpler set of
facts, some more complicated, more difficult to prove facts are as-
sumed to be true. This requires an assertion of a relationship be-
tween the facts proven and the fact presumed true. This relation-
ship is typically established by experience. One has observed so
many instances in which the facts proven and the fact presumed
coincided that one comes to expect, as a matter of course in run-
ning one's every day life that where the facts actually proven ex-
ist, so will the fact presumed true. The presumptions each of us
95 Indeed, plaintiffs may find it easier to avoid summary judgment against them in the
wake of Hicks. At least one court has ruled that, where the plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case and the employer raises no defenses at law, such as failure to comply with statu-
tory prerequisites, and the plaintiff merely asserts that the employer's proffered reasons
are untrue without offering any evidence on that point, Hicks prevents summary judgment
for the employer because the plaintiff is nevertheless entitled to have the jury determine
the credibility of the employer's proffered reasons and whether the lack of that credibility
indicates illegal discrimination. See Moisi v. College of the Sequoias Community, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 165, 170-72 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The court applies the California Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act, for which California courts have adopted the same legal stan-
dards used under Title VII when deciding discrimination cases. Id. While this may be cor-
rect, the plaintiff would nonetheless have to indicate the evidence which shows there is a
genuine issue of material fact, i.e., that a rational jury could find the employer's proffered
reasons incredible and find an intent to discriminate on the employer's part. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 56.
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employs in every day life are formed in this manner. If we hear a
skid and crash in the near distance, and proceed to the direction of
its source and see an automobile wrapped around a tree, we pre-
sume that the automobile made the sounds we heard, hit the tree,
and was damaged by the impact. Presumptions are a matter of
accumulated experienced: we know something of what causes
both the sounds and the damage to the auto and we have heard
autos make that noise and hit objects and be damaged. We need
not see the impact to infer its existence from other evidence we
have come, from experience, to associate with it. Notice that this
method of establishing the relationship looks backward to experi-
ence, to a set of data about events which may be examined for the
frequency and reliability of the coincidence of the facts proven and
the fact presumed true.
In the case of the presumption of illegal discrimination created
by the proof of a prima facie case used in disparate intent cases,
little judicial examination has been made of the asserted relation-
ship between the facts shown in the prima facie case the facts of
illegal discrimination presumed. When the Supreme Court estab-
lished the presumption in McDonnell Douglas, neither it, nor
courts in general, had accumulated a great deal of experience in
how employers make decisions. Nor has Congress carefully con-
sidered what set of more easily proven facts coincide with the
more difficult to determine intent to discriminate on race, sex,
religion, or national origin.
In Furnco, the Supreme Court claimed it presumes illegal dis-
crimination on proof of a prima facie case "because we presume
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not
based on the consideration of impermissible factors."96 Employers
act for some reason, the Court argued, so "when all legitimate rea-
sons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible
reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the
employer.., based his decision on an impermissible consideration
such as race."9 v The Court, however, has never made any effort to
explain how it arrived at the conclusion that the prima facie case
articulates and eliminates as possible bases "all legitimate rea-
96 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); see also International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) (discussing inference of
discrimination).
97 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
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sons" for the employer's decision. The Court claimed to be merely
laying out and eliminating the legitimate bases for the decision, a
descriptive statement. In claiming to consider "all legitimate rea-
sons," the Supreme Court could not help but make either a power-
ful normative statement about how employers should make deci-
sions or a fatally conceited statement about its power, and the
power of other courts, to enumerate and consider all legitimate
bases.
The McDonnell Douglas presumption is based, not upon the ac-
cumulation of experience of the coincidence of one set of facts with
another, but upon an ideology which posits that relationship with-
out proof. This ideology holds that an employment decision ad-
verse to a black, ethnic minority, or woman who possesses any
possibility of performing even minimally acceptably in the job is
very likely due to racism, that the state is competent to, and must,
determine independently of the employer whether the applicant
was qualified for the job and thus whether the employer's decision
was racist or sexist. In other words, racial, sexual, ethnic, or reli-
gious groups would be evenly distributed if not for discrimination.
There is no evidence, of course, to support this notion of "natu-
rally" random distribution of people's performance or preferences;
to the contrary, much evidence suggests that people usually do not
behave in a random or even distribution.98 Nevertheless, this lib-
eral civil rights ideology pervades employment discrimination to
such an extent that it has become a virtually unstated and unchal-
lenged context for every discussion within it.
The plaintiff gains the advantage of the presumption when she
is in a "protected class" of a particular race, sex, religion, or
ethnicity, is rejected for a position, and proves she is "qualified"
for the job. Usually, there is little controversy regarding class sta-
tus and rejection. Thus, in the liberal civil rights ideology of the
McDonnell Douglas presumption, lack of "qualification" is the only
"legitimate reason" for the employer's rejection of the protected-
class plaintiff for an open position.99
The courts' notion of determining qualification, however, differs
98 See THOMAS SOWELL, CIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY (1984); THOMAS SOWELL, By
the Numbers, in COMPASSION VERSus GUILT 228-30 (1987).
99 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. Establishment of a prima facie case, including proof of quali-
fication for the position, raises a presumption of illegal discrimination because it eliminates
'all legitimate reasons" for rejecting an applicant. Id.
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significantly from the way employers make decisions. Even if
courts sought to determine each and all of the requirements of the
position in question, and to determine who was the most qualified
available candidate, they would, by necessity, simplify the posi-
tion to make the determination of what skills are necessary. In
addition, a court cannot possibly consider the entire role the per-
son in the position must play. In even the most simple of organi-
zations, these calculations involve too many variables for a court
to efficiently consider.
More importantly, even if employers have no more information
than do courts, they have perfect incentive to make the right
choice. Employers who choose incorrectly are punished in the bot-
tom line of profits; courts who second-guess incorrectly suffer no
consequences. Under these circumstances, even the most careful
and well-intentioned courts are likely to be wrong far more often
than employers. The employer is chastened and informed by the
market; the court is not disciplined by the market. Yet, the court
is called upon to determine both the objective qualifications of the
position and whether the plaintiff meets them. Ironically, the
Furnco Court rejected the court of appeals' order requiring the
employer to adopt certain hiring practices on essentially this ob-
jection: "Courts are generally less competent than employers to
restructure business practices .... "10o
Nor have courts even attempted to mimic a "prejudice-free" ver-
sion of the employer's decision-making. In determining the plain-
tiffs qualification for the job, courts have not sought merely to de-
termine the employer's true requirements for the job or
employment decision-making process. Rather, they have con-
sciously disregarded some elements of those decisions. Courts are
hostile, for instance, to employer qualification requirements they
label "subjective," ostensibly because they see potential for abuse
of those requirements as pretext to act on illegal bases.' 01 Even
evaluations of productivity and efficiency may be so classified and
dismissed as objections to the establishment of the plaintiffs qual-
ification for the position.1 0 2 The employer's knowledge of the
plaintiffs abilities is, in fact, irrelevant to the establishment of the
100 Id. at 578.
101 See, e.g., Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir. 1990).
102 Id. at 799.
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plaintiffs qualifications.10 3 Where the plaintiffs current job is, in
the court's judgment, similar to the position in question, and the
plaintiff has performed the current job adequately, again in the
judgment of the court, the plaintiff may be found qualified for the
position. 10 4 A court may find good performance appraisals in the
plaintiffs current job support a finding that plaintiff is qualified
for another position.10 5 If an employer merely considered a plain-
tiff for a promotional position, and she has received good perform-
ance appraisals, a court may find the plaintiff qualified for the
promotion even if she has served six years less than the typical
tenure required for the promotion. '0 6 Courts have repeatedly held
that merely adequate or mediocre credentials are sufficient to es-
tablish the plaintiffs qualification. Though "an employer... dis-
satisfied with the performance of an employee.... can properly
raise the issue in rebuttal of the plaintiffs showing," 0 7 this
misses the point: the presumption allegedly applies only when the
employee was qualified for the position.
Courts have, thus, demonstrated their hostility to an employer's
use of the criteria the employer itself has chosen, unless the em-
ployer may demonstrate the criteria in a form the court is comfort-
able in understanding. The employer is presumed to have dis-
criminated based on the plaintiffs qualification for the position,
yet the legal determination of qualification bears little, if any, re-
lationship to the employer's decision making regarding the posi-
tion. The liberal civil rights ideology, and courts, presume racism
or sexism based upon a showing that has virtually nothing to do
with whether the employer considered the plaintiff capable of per-
forming the duties of the position.
The Supreme Court's claim that the prima facie case merely de-
scribes and considers all the permissible bases for the employment
decision is false. Determinations of prima facie cases have be-
come, as they inevitably had to become, the normative task of de-
termining which criteria for decisions the use of which the court,
and thus the state, will punish by a presumption of illegality of
103 See, e.g., Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990).
104 See Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1172 (7th Cir. 1992).
105 Id. at 1168.
106 See Churchill v. IBM, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1089, 1103 (D.N.J. 1991).
107 Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1155 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984
(1978).
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the decision itself.
Courts of law are not particularly adept at determining the
skills a particular position requires. More importantly, courts of
law, unlike the employer itself, are not faced with the conse-
quences of an incorrect decision. In a competitive economy, if the
employer makes a poor choice of employee (by hiring the less-
than-optimum available person), the employer's business will suf-
fer. On the other hand, successful choices redound to the benefit
of the employer's business. It is this (nearly) perfect capture of the
costs and benefits of employment decisions which, along with com-
petition for scarce resources, such as skilled and valuable employ-
ees, which creates the efficiencies, and justice, of the pricing sys-
tem in a free market. If courts, however, make an incorrect
choice, neither the judge nor anyone else in the government suf-
fers. Nor is a correct choice rewarded. Judges' compensation and
prestige is not determined by the productivity of employees or em-
ployers whom they have "matched" by virtue of determining that
the employee was qualified for a position with the employer but
was denied the job for some "illegitimate reason." In fact, the
judge's (and, indeed, the entire government's) "compensation" is
increased, especially in terms of power over others, by finding ille-
gal discrimination and ordering appropriate relief. Political sensi-
bilities and the creation and maintenance of power over others by
fiat and force are the driving force of government. The employer
in a competitive market, by contrast, while desiring money or
power, must persuade others to trade with her. Her own assets
are at risk should she fail.
The court's self-interest is also relevant in determining why a
court will tend to find a prima facie case of discrimination. As an
organ of the state, the court has a powerful incentive to underesti-
mate the qualifications of the job. Each time it does so, a pre-
sumption is established which the employer may not be able to
rebut. If the employer fails to rebut the presumption, the court
finds illegal discrimination and the court, and other organs of the
state, may exercise power over the employer. Thus, the presump-
tion increases the opportunity for the court, and the state as a
whole, to exercise power.
The presumption of illegal discrimination affects employer be-
havior in a number of ways. Because only the failure to hire or
promote an employee in a "protected class" normally gives rise to a
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cause of action, employers may find it advantageous to hire, re-
tain, and promote those within "protected classes." In this way,
the presumption works to redistribute wealth from employers,
and employees not within a "protected class," to employees within
those classes. In addition, the employer is penalized for setting
the qualifications of jobs differently from the way a court will ac-
cept in determining the prima facie case.
The court's method of determining qualification favors the bu-
reaucratic model of organization, in which rigid hierarchies divide
responsibility and accountability in a way easily described by job
description and organization charts. Alternative means of organi-
zation, some of which may be more conducive to entrepreneurial
activity, put the employer at a disadvantage in an employment
discrimination suit setting. Alternative forms may lack the clear
job descriptions and flow charts describing supervision and re-
sponsibility which are useful in justifying a rejection to a court.
An organization established on a different model may lack the
"hard data" on job positions which bureaucratic organizations
more easily produce. By penalizing innovation with artificial
costs, the McDonnell Douglas scheme is fundamentally anti-
competitive.
The legal determination of "qualification" for a job is a task
which cannot possibly be done with accuracy by a court, agency, or
indeed any organ of the state. The qualifications for a job is one
aspect of the price of the job, one of the terms upon which two
freely contracting parties must settle in order to come to agree-
ment upon an employment relationship. Administrative or judi-
cial determinations of job "qualifications" are thus price-fixing, a
form of central economic planning. The failures of central eco-
nomic planning, also known as socialism, fascism, or (more euphe-
mistically) "industrial policy," are legion throughout history, in-
cluding the history of our century. Because a price reflects the
knowledge of all actors in the market combined, but not of any one
actor, no single decision-maker, including a court, can possibly ac-
curately calculate a price to be imposed on others.108 Just as im-
108 The knowledge which sets prices accurately in the free market is dispersed in the
minds of all the actors in that market. No single mind may hold all this information, or act
on it before it has changed to reflect changed circumstances. This was one insight of the
great Friedrich A. von Hayek. See FRIEDRICH A. voN HAYEK, INDMDUALISM AND ECONOMIC
ORDER 90-91 (1948); FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD To SERFDOM 49-51 (1944). Ludwig
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portantly, no single decision-maker can change the price rapidly
enough to encapsulate the constant flow of new information which
reflects upon the value of the good or service priced. As a result,
the price is bound to be set higher or lower than the free market.
This is no small problem; an inaccurate price means economic dis-
location from the jobs and utility the free market would produce.
Nor is an accurate assessment of the "qualifications" for a job
necessarily the paramount concern of the state (though the ap-
pearance of accuracy is important). The presumption serves to in-
crease the power of the state over both employers and employees.
The freedom of individuals and organizations shrinks accordingly,
and the economic dislocation creates real costs and lost opportuni-
ties. The practical failure and misery produced by just this kind of
state central planning are real, but so are the benefits to those
who hold the power of the state.
The search for the proper, objective "qualifications" of a job is
one variation on the eternal, and eternally futile, quest for the
"just price" or "fair wage." No price is objectively fair, or just, or
reasonable, because the prices in a single transaction reflect the
assessment of value of the contracting parties in light of the other
uses to which each could put her resources, and the price set in
the market reflects the sum of such calculations by all actors.
Prices are ever-changing to reflect recalculations of these values
by the actors involved. What we mean by a "fair price" is often
that which we have come to expect from recent past experience.
But this price has been set, unless the government has inter-
vened, by competitive market forces. Once those are removed, the
price loses all significance as an accurate distribution of
resources. 1
09
More importantly, fixing a price also stifles the technological de-
velopment which allows prices of goods and services to drop.
Without a competitively set price, no one would bother to devote
his resources to the development of methods to cheaper or better
von Mises, Hayek, and other members of the Austrian school of economics have argued that
the price system in a free market is essential to bring to bear the knowledge of the efficient
allocation of resources held only in small constituent parts by each of the numberless eco-
nomic actors who trade in goods and services. See Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Nature and
History of the Problem, and Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Com-
monwealth, in COLLECTIVIsT ECONOMIC PLANNING (Friedrich A. von Hayek ed. 1967).
109 For one discussion of the "just price" fallacy, see VON HAYEK, supra note 108, at 110-
12.
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production. In this way, goods and services which are, at one
point in time, relatively expensive become relatively cheap.
Would, for example, computers become smaller, faster, and
cheaper if the price of a computer had been set at the astronomical
cost required to produce the first one? In the same vein, would
they continue to get smaller, faster, and cheaper if the price was
set at that which competition happened to produce today? The an-
swer, of course, is no. There is no "just price" for a computer, nor
for any other good or service.
The same analysis is true with regard the price for labor, both
in terms of the wages and benefits employers must pay to attract
employees and in terms of the abilities, experiences, and qualities
the employee must offer to attract an offer from the employer. We
should not be surprised, then, when shortages of employers,
shortages of jobs, and sluggish development of newer forms of jobs
(and, indeed, of entire economic organizations) are stifled when
the state sets the "price" of employment by an attempt to deter-
mine the objective, fair, "qualifications" of a job. Such a determi-
nation is, of course, at the heart of the prima facie case of illegal
discrimination.
The Supreme Court, without any reference from statute or com-
mon law, pulled the policy of presuming discrimination by deter-
mining the plaintiffs "qualifications" for the position from thin
air. This effectively transformed the disparate impact case from
once whose purpose is to determine whether the plaintiff can
prove that the employer based her decision on race, gender, reli-
gion, or national origin, into one concerned with whether the em-
ployer can prove she had a legitimate reason for the decision. The
policy behind the presumption is inextricably bound to the polit-
ical and ideological notions of the employment relationship, of
management, and of the proper role of government in free peoples'
lives. 110
The McDonnell Douglas presumption is not an example of a pre-
sumption created over time from the common law traditional ac-
cumulation of judicial experience about the relationship between
110 Government price-fixing, as with all central planning has a great impact, not only on
the material welfare of a people, but also on their political, social, and economic freedom.
Government attempts to centrally plan an economy lead to slavery as well as poverty. For a
discussion of the connection between central planning and the loss of freedom more
broadly, see FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE RoAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
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events. Rather, it is a presumption established, as some presump-
tions are, as a substantive point of law, a "change [in] the accepted
rules of the common law without the appearance of judicial legis-
lation." 1 ' The presumption's creation was, however, quite outside
the common-law tradition because it offered no precedent or rea-
soning. The application of the presumption is a political decision
intended to affect out-of-court behavior, in this case by punishing
the failure to favor those in a "protected class" in employment de-
cisions. The presumption, used this way, is a political allocation of
power to the state and certain employees and away from the em-
ployer and the employee.
How much power is allocated to the state and to those in a "pro-
tected class" depends on the strength of the presumption in court.
Presumptions, of course, may vary in their strength, i.e., they may
be conclusive or rebuttable, may shift the burden of production or
the risk of nonpersuasion, etc. The strength of the presumption
depends on what burden is placed on an opposing party. In this
case, the strength of the presumption depends on what the em-
ployer must do in court to overcome the presumption and return
the inquiry to one in which no fact is presumed. The burden on
employers of merely producing legally permissible reasons for the
decision by Hicks is comparatively light. Hicks thus reduces the
likelihood that the employer will fail to carry the burden. While
the state may still exercise power over the employer, it must do so
only on the fact-finder's conclusion of illegal discrimination, and
not on less. By eliminating the lesser justification for state inter-
vention, that the employer's offered reasons are incredible, Hicks
reduces the chances that the state will have the opportunity to
exercise power over the employer. This reduced chance and op-
portunity for state intervention in the employment market is at
the heart of liberal objection to Hicks.
The liberal civil rights ideology sees racism and sexism lurking
in most employers and, truth be told, in most lay people as well.
This was precisely the worry of Justice David Souter's dissent.
Justice Souter was overwhelmingly concerned with the fact-finder
scouring the record for a reason for the employer's decision other
111 Edmund M. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARv. L. REv.
906, 909 (1931).
1993]
94 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
than that explicitly advanced by the employer. 112 Justice Souter
implies that the employer will somehow indicate to the jury in an
inexplicit way, perhaps by "code words," that the plaintiff did not,
and should not, get the position due the plaintiff's race, sex, na-
tional origin, or religion. The employer, who was motivated by
prejudice, cannot state the true basis for the decision, and so both
fabricates one while managing to convey the subtle yet effective
message of the inferiority of those of the plaintiffs skin color, sex,
etc. The jury, in Justice Souter's scenario, will have its innate ra-
cism, sexism, xenophobia, etc., played to, and find for the
employer.
This may explain the vehemence of the dissent's disagreement
with the majority. The dissent, like the liberal civil rights ideol-
ogy, sees impermissible motivation deep in the hearts of employ-
ers and the general public alike, and believes that the state must
work hard to root it out. Hicks, though it merely requires the
plaintiff to prove the ultimate fact, hinders this effort. Hicks
threatens the liberal ideology that "evil" prejudices are so deeply
enmeshed that, even where they are not proven, they must be
presumed.
CONCLUSION
As a practical matter, Hicks changes virtually nothing about
how employers defend disparate treatment cases. The plaintiffs
case will be somewhat tougher than if she could prevail merely by
showing the falsity of the employer's offered reason; but the plain-
tiff may still prove intentional discrimination indirectly, by argu-
ing to the fact-finder that the employer is not being truthful and
that the real reason for the decision was an illegal one. The polit-
ical significance of the presumption of illegal discrimination, how-
ever, was harmed. That the case was taken by some to so greatly
harm plaintiffs' chances of winning employment discrimination
112 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2762 (1993) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Souter commented:
[A] victim of discrimination lacking direct evidence will now be saddled with the tre-
mendous disadvantage of having to confront, not the defined task of proving the em-
ployer's stated reasons to be false, but the amorphous requirement of disproving all
possible non-discriminatory reasons that a fact-finder might finding lurking in the
record.
Id.
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suits is a clear sign of the weakness of the political principle un-
derlying the presumption of illegal discrimination.

